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Abstract
We develop an endogenous fertility model of social stratication with two hereditary classes:
warriors and peasants. Our model shows that the extra cost warriors must incur to raise their
children and to equip them for war is the key determinant of (1) the relative sizes of both
classes, and (2) the warriors economic privileges in terms of income and consumption. The
higher the cost of warrior children, the greater the economic privileges of warriors will be,
and the smaller the ratio of warriors to peasants will be. Historical evidence conrms this
prediction.
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1 Introduction
Social stratication is a central concern of both Sociology and Anthropology. Although these
disciplines have gone a long way describing and explaining social stratication, their theories eschew
generalization and are, in consequence, largely devoid of testable predictions.1 Believing there
are general principles underlying all social phenomena, we take the opposite road and develop a
microeconomic model that answers two questions: what determines the class composition in a
stratied society, and what determines the degree of economic privilege of its upper classes. This
model produces a set of predictions that can be tested against historical evidence. Also, the formal
approach of economics allows us to identify some of the mechanisms behind the stratication of
human societies.
Most anthropological and sociological theories of early social stratication share three recurrent
themes. First, early stratied societies divide labor between warriors that ght wars and a peasants
that work the land. Second, a society must be able to produce a sizable food surplus (i.e., more food
than is needed to feed the peasants and their families) in order to support the non-food-producing
warrior class. Third, social positions in early stratied societies are, for the most part, hereditary.
Our model integrates these three themes into an endogenous-fertility framework, which takes into
account the demographic forces that inuence social stratication.2
The main features of our model are as follows. There are two states, always at war with each
other. Populations in both states are unisex. Each state is divided into two hereditary social classes:
warriors, who own the land, protect their own state, and plunder its neighbor; and peasants, who
work for the warriors producing the food necessary to support both classes. People maximize utility
by choosing how many children to have and how much food to consume, constrained by their food
income and the cost of children in units of food. Children and food consumption are substitutes and
are both normal goods (their demand is an increasing function of income when relative prices are
xed). Warrior children are more expensive than peasant children because they must be equipped
and trained for war. There are diminishing returns to labor in food production. In the long-run,
population must adapt itself to the amount of food that is available from production and from
plunder.
Our model produces three main predictions:
1. The average warrior enjoys higher income and higher consumption than the average peasant.
In the long-run, the average warrior and the average peasant must have exactly one child.
Otherwise, the absolute and relative sizes of the two classes will not be stable. These averages
include people who have no children because they die prematurely and survivors with more
1See subsections 1.1 and 1.2 for a brief review of these theories, and Summers (2005) for a more detailed account.
2Endogenous fertility models were pioneered by Razin and Ben-Zion (1975). Among these models, ours is closely
related to those in which diminishing returns to labor operate as a Malthusian population check; for example, Boldrin
and Jones (2002), Eckstein et al. (1988), and Nerlove et al. (1986).
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than one child. Because warrior children are more expensive than peasant children, warriors
must receive extra income in order to persuade them to have the same number of children
as peasants. Since children and food are normal goods, warriors spend some of their extra
income on food and hence on average enjoy a higher level of consumption than peasants.
2. As the relative cost of warrior children increases, the size of the warrior class relative to the
peasantry falls and the warriors economic privileges increase. In the long run, the average
warrior or peasant must support exactly one child. Since children are normal goods, an
increase in their price will induce warriors to substitute food for children, and that will bring
average warrior fertility below one. In order to restore equilibrium, the per capita income
of warriors must rise up to a point where they are again willing to have one child. This
is accomplished by reducing the relative size of the warrior class: the reduction in warrior
fertility induces a decline in warrior population, and as land is divided among fewer warriors
than before, each of them will earn a bigger rent. Because consumption is a normal good and
a substitute for children, part of this bigger rent will be used to nance the more expensive
children and part will be destined to nance more consumption.
3. Taking technology and prices as given, total population will be lower in a stratied state than
in an unstratied state. There are two reasons for this. First, stratied states employ less
people on the land and therefore produce less food than unstratied states, and less food
means fewer people can be fed. Second, the per capita income of warriors is higher than the
per capita income of peasants, so even the same amount of food would support fewer people
in a stratied state.
The rest of this introduction reviews the sociological and anthropological theories of social
stratication, and presents the main empirical regularities. It also covers the basics of Malthusian
population theories, necessary to understand the demographic aspects of our model. We invite
readers already familiar with this literatures to go straight to Section 2, where we outline our
model, discuss its predictions, and test them against historical evidence.
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1.1 Agriculture and social stratication developed together
Evidence of early social stratication, mostly in the form of artifacts interred with the dead, is
rst found in the same archeological stratum as the oldest vestiges of agriculture (Angle, 1986).
Ethnographic studies reveal that most contemporary bands of hunter-gatherers, such as the !Kung
in the Kalahari or the Yolngu in Arnhem Land, are egalitarian and devoid of leadership (Boehm,
1999; Knauft, 1994; Winterhalder, 2001). We do not know for sure how prehistoric hunter-gatherers
organized themselves, but the archeological evidence and the observation of their contemporary
remnants indicate prehistoric hunter-gatherers lacked social stratication. All early agrarian states,
on the contrary, were socially stratied (e.g., Sumer, Ancient Egypt, and Mycenaean Greece). The
parallel emergence of agriculture and social stratication suggests that both developments were in
some way related.
The ability to produce a surplus of food lies at the core of many theories of social stratication.
The argument runs as follows. Surplus food is required to support a non-food-producing upper
class. Agriculture has the potential to yield a surplus, and that explains why agrarian societies can
be stratied. Hunter-gatherers, on the other hand, are always living on the edge of subsistence:
chronically undernourished and constantly threatened by famine [evidence of this is surveyed by
Kaplan (2000)]. They are thus unable to a¤ord a class of non-food-producers. Gordon Childe
(1942, p. 18; 1954) is the foremost surplus theorist of social stratication, and his ideas are (not
surprisingly) very popular among Marxists thinkers (e.g., Beaucage, 1976, pp. 409410; Mandel,
1962, pp. 26, 43).
The surplus theories of social stratication have several critics. Pearson (1957), for instance,
argues that all societies have the potential to produce food in excess of biological necessity. It is the
social organization what generates a surplus, and not the other way round. Sahlins (1972/1998)
maintains that the key precondition for social stratication is not the ability to produce surplus food,
but the feasibility of food storage [see also Cashdan (1980) and Hayden (1995)]. Without storage,
Sahlins argues, there is no accumulation of wealth, and without wealth, social inequalities cannot
exist. Most hunter-gatherers are nomads: as they quickly deplete local resources, they have no other
choice but to keep moving. Nomadism makes storing food, and thus stratication, impossible. It
comes to Sahlins as no surprise that the few reported cases of stratied hunter-gatherer communities
are all located in exceptionally favorable ecological niches, where the abundance of food allows for
permanent settlement and thus for food storage [Testart (1982) surveys the evidence]. The Pomo
people of Central California are a classic example of a stratied gathering society. Acorns, the
staple of the Pomo diet before modernization, were only available during one month in autumn.
During that month the Pomo gathered the acorn and stored it for the rest of the year. The acorn
stores were controlled by the chiefs (Kni¤en, 1939).
Whatever the preconditions to stratication may be (surplus, storage, or both), it remains to
be explained how an upper class of non-food-producers can emerge. Two opposing explanations
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have been proposed: a conict-based explanation, advanced by Fried (1967; see also Hayden, 1995),
and a functionalist explanation, attributed to Service (1962; also found in Davis, 1949, p. 367).
Conict theorists hold that aggrandizersseized control of the means of production, and then used
the surplus to obtain a superior standard of living. The functionalists, on the other hand, believe
the upper classes provide goods that benet society as whole: they lead war parties and organize
defenses, build and maintain irrigation systems, store food as famine relief, and manage intergroup
trade. As a reward for their services, the lower classes allow the upper classes a greater share of
societys wealth.
Between these extremes, intermediate positions have emerged. For instance, Johnson and Earle
(2000) maintain that the intensication of agriculture and consequent population growth pose a
number of problems that can only be solved through hierarchy and the centralization of power:
resource competition leading to raidings and warfare, the risk of failure in food production, ine¢ cient
use of resources that call for major technology investments, and resource deciencies that can only
be made up by foreign trade (pp. 2932). Once power is acquired by an upper class, that group
uses its power to establish privileges for itself (pp. 266277, 301303). At the same time, the lower
classes face a trade-o¤ between the benets they derive from the public goods provided by the
upper classes, and the burden of inequality net of the cost of revolting (Boone, 1992).
1.2 The rise of an hereditary warrior class
The intensication of agriculture required people to abandon nomadism and become sedentary.
Sedentism, in turn, created competition for the most productive soils, and the opportunity to ran-
sack the food stores of neighbouring communities. As a result, warfare escalated among early agrar-
ian societies (Johnson and Earle, 2000, p. 252). The mounting demands of war triggered dramatic
enhancements in military technology (Ferguson, 2003), creating the need for professional warriors
that could handle it (Carneiro, 1970; Webster, 1975). The increased e¤ectiveness of weaponry
widened the ghting advantage of warriors over peasants. It is a common view among anthro-
pologist and sociologists that the monopoly of weapons allowed warriors to prevent upward social
mobility and become an hereditary social class (Summers, 2005).
According to Andreski (1968, pp. 3132), a class of warriors can emerge in two ways: either by
gradual di¤erentiation of warriors from the rest of the population, or by conquest and subjugation of
another group. Gradual di¤erentiation occurs when a group manages to monopolize arms-bearing
in order to secure a privileged position in society, or if the professionalization of warriors is necessary
for society to augment its military power. Andreski maintains that conquest was the most common
mechanism of social stratication, and provides a long list of historical cases to back up his claim:
the subjugation of one city by another in Sumer (p. 42), the Dorian invasions in Greece (p. 43
44), and the Norse conquest of Russian Slavic tribes (p. 62), to mention just a few. Perhaps the
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chemically purest examples of stratication by conquest can be found in East Africa and Sudan.
In that regions, ample kingdoms where founded through the conquest of negroid agriculturalists by
hamitic pastoralists (p. 32). In Ankole, for instance, the pastoralist Hima conquered the agricultural
Iru sometime before the British colonization. The Hima forced the Iru to pay tribute and allowed
them no political rights. Only Iru men were allowed to bear arms and participate in war.
1.3 Malthusian principles of social stratication
The size and quality of the professional army that a society can support depends on the size of the
surplus that the society can generate. In turn, the size of the surplus depends on three factors:
rst, the number of workers; second, the productivity of the average worker; and third, the amount
consumed by the average worker and his dependants. From Malthus onwards, there has been a
lively debate on the interplay between these factors (Coleman and Scholeld, 1986). The classical
tradition, exemplied by Malthus and Ricardo, assumed a perfectly elastic supply of population at
a constant subsistence wage rate together with diminishing returns to labor. If wages rise above
subsistence, population will expand, leading to more employment. That will force downwards
the marginal product of labor and thus wages. This process will only come to a halt when the
marginal product of labor equals the subsistence wage, at which point the laboring population will
stop growing. This is also the point at which the surplus product, in the form of rent, will be
maximized.
To the extent that the adoption of agriculture involves the development of a more costly military
technology and the emergence of a class of specialist warriors, not all of the extra output produced
by agriculture can be translated into support for more producers and their families. A fraction of
total production must be used to maintain and equip the warrior class. This point was made by
Sauvy (1999), who argued that achieving a power optimumrequires maximizing the surplus that
is available to support the military and the government apparatus more generally.
How is population to be regulated so as to generate a surplus, subject to the limits set by
technology and the environment? The growth of population within a given territory is determined
by a combination of fertility, mortality, and migration, the relative importance of which has varied
widely across time and space. The role of migration is obvious and is uncontroversial, so we shall
focus on the other factors.
The original Malthusian theory assumed that population is automatically regulated through
some kind of homeostatic mechanism. If population gets too large relative to available resources,
there will be malnutrition, famine, disease, and warfare causing premature deaths. This formulation
is based on the biological analogy that an animal species will blindly multiply up to the limits set by
the carrying capacity of its habitat. Other formulations rely on conscious choice or social convention
to limit population. Malthus himself in his later writings suggested prudential restraint involving
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late marriage or celibacy (Malthus 1820, pp. 248252). Abortion, infanticide, and prolonged breast-
feeding may also serve to space out births or get rid of unwanted children, and were all common
practices among pre-modern societies (Douglas, 1966; Cashdan, 1985; Macfarlane, 1997). Some of
these practices were deliberately designed to limit population, whereas others were social practices
that were followed without any such objective in mind. However, even non deliberate social practices
may have a homeostatic e¤ect. Di¤erent societies compete with each other and those with practices
that most e¤ectively regulate population may outcompete their rivals. Thus, group selection may
lead to the emergence of population practices that are well-adapted to the prevailing environment
(Wrigley, 1978).
A controversial notion that needs to be claried at this point is that of subsistence consumption.
Some versions of Malthusian theory interpret this notion in biological terms, assimilating it to the
minimum food intake that allows a human being to survive and to produce an average of one
o¤spring (e.g., Wolf, 1966, p. 6). The later Malthus regarded such an idea as simplistic, and he
stressed the inuence of socially-conditioned preferences on reproductive behavior (Malthus, pp.
248252; Costabile and Rowthorn, 1985). This was a common view among classical economists,
such as Ricardo, who expressed himself as follows:
It is not to be understood that the natural price of labour, estimated even in food
and necessaries, is absolutely xed and constant... It essentially depends on the habits
and customs of the people. An English labourer would consider his wages under their
natural rate, and too scanty to support a family, if they enabled him to purchase no
other food than potatoes... Many of the conveniences now enjoyed in an English cottage,
would have been thought luxurious at an earlier period of our history.(Ricardo, 1821,
p. 91).
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2 The Model
2.1 Setup
An agrarian state called Home is composed of N  0 adults.3 The adults are divided into Nw  0
warriors and Np  0 peasants, where N = Nw+Np. Warriors wage war against Homes neighboring
state, Foreign. The purpose of war is to capture food, which peasants produce by working the land.
Warriors own the land in equal shares, hire labor from the peasants, and protect them from pillaging
by Foreign warriors. Social positions are hereditary: the children of warriors become warriors, and
the children of peasants become peasants. Adults are averse to death, and derive utility from eating
food and having children.
2.1.1 War
Let Nfw be the the number of Foreign warriors and N
f
p the number of Foreign peasants. Every year
Home and Foreign go to war. During war, Home captures a fraction  of Foreigns food surplus
and keeps a fraction 1 f of its own. These fractions depend on the relative ghting strengths of
the two sides, as follows:
 = f

Nw
Nw +Nfw

; (1)
f = f

Nfw
Nw +Nfw

: (2)
where f 0 > 0: Note that  = F if Nw = NFw :
Nothing is directly destroyed by war. Yet war reduces food production because it removes people
from farming to place them in the battleeld.
2.1.2 Food production and allocation
Home food production is given by Y = ALN1 p , where A > 0 is the total factor productivity,
and  2 (0; 1) measures the intensiveness of land in production. Following Andreski (1968, pp.
7576), we assume that the amount of land controlled by Home is positively related to the relative
e¤ectiveness of attack over defense, represented by the parameter  > 0. Letting L = L0
 , where
 > 0, and normalising L0 to 1 we get
Y = ALN1 p = A
N1 p : (3)
3We use Keeleys (1996) denition of states: class-stratied political units that maintain a monopoly of deadly
force a monopoly institutionalized as permanent police and military forces. (p. 27)
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If Home is unstratied (i.e., if Nw = 0), peasants will earn their average product. If, on the
contrary, Home is stratied (i.e., if Nw > 0), total food production must be divided between Home
warriors and Home peasants. Assume peasants earn a fraction 1   of total food production and
warriors take the rest. This allocation can be justied in two ways.
First, it could result from a crop-sharing rule established by social convention. Crop-sharing
rules are frequent among early agriculturalists (Raper and Reid, 1941, pp. 3536). Of all possible
crop-sharing rules, dividing production between warriors and peasants in fractions  and 1  will
maximize the military power of the state (see proof in Appendix A.1), which is equivalent in our
model to Nw. In a warlike environment it is to be expected that group selection will favour those
social conventions that maximize military power.
Second, the same allocation will result if labor markets are competitive. Competitiveness implies
peasants will earn their marginal product, which is equal to (1  )Y . The assumption of a
competitive labor market may seem unrealistic at a rst glance, since historically peasants were
often bound to the land. In practice, escape was often easy, and peasants deserted their lord and
sought a new one when they felt mistreated (North and Paul, 1973, pp. 30, 79, 200). In China, for
instance, massive desertions of peasants were not only possible but indeed frequent, turning the
tide of war against the deserted lord and in favour of the new one (Andreski, 1868, p. 48).
Let p 2 (0; 1] be the probability of a peasant reaching reproductive age. Assuming the incomes
of peasants who die before reproducing are inherited by their relatives, the income of the typical
surviving peasant is given by
yp =
8>>><>>>:
(1  )Y
pNp
if Nw > 0;
Y
pNp
if Nw = 0:
(4)
Surviving warriors earn a rent from land and also get a share of the net spoils of war:
yw =
Y
wNw| {z }
Rent of land
+
Y f   fY
wNw| {z }
Net spoils of war
; (5)
where w 2 (0; 1] is a warriorsprobability of reaching reproductive age and Y f = A(Nfp )1  is
Foreigns food production.
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2.1.3 Consumption, reproduction, and utility
People who die prematurely do not eat and do not bear children. The utility of a person is given
by
u =
1+cn1 
 (1  )1 
;
where where  is the probability of reaching reproductive age, c  0 is his consumption, and n  0
is the number of his children. The parameter  2 (0; 1) represents the weight of consumption in
utility, and  > 0 is a measure of death aversion. Consumption may not consist exclusively of food.
Both warriors and peasants may use part of their incomes to purchase manufactured goods that
are obtained at a xed relative price by trading with the outside world. We do not explore this
issue and assume that imported manufactures are represented in the utility function in terms of
their food equivalent.
Historical evidence suggests that fertility among pre-modern peoples depended on the income
available to them. The methods they used to limit the number of their children included absti-
nence, celibacy, prolonged breast-feeding, abortion, and infanticide (Douglas, 1966; Cashdan, 1985;
Macfarlane, 1997). Recourse to such methods was more frequent when times were hard than in
good times. To capture the link between fertility and income we shall assume that each adult solves
max
fc;ng
1+cn1 
s.t. c+ n = y;
c; n > 0;
where  > 0 is the price of a child in units of food and y is the adults income.
The solution to an adults problem is given by
c = y; (6)
n =
(1  ) y

; (7)
u =
1+y
1 
: (8)
This is the standard result of the consumer problem with a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Ex-
penditures on consumption and children are constant fractions of income, and indirect utility is
increasing in food income and decreasing in the relative price of children.
Children are cheaper for peasants than for warriors: p < w. This di¤erence can be read
as the extra cost that warriors face in order to equip and train their children for war. As an
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example, consider the case of Spartans, who were taken away from their mothers to start their
military training as young as seven years old (OConnell, 2002, p. 42). Another example is given
by Prestwich (1996), who reports that a complete armour in Middle Ages would cost the equivalent
of a 1939 light tank. According to Andreski (1968, p. 58), the total cost of equipping one knight
amounted to the annual income of a whole village, making knighthood a heavy nancial burden.
There is some evidence that before Modern Times warriors had a lesser chance than peasants
of reaching reproductive age. According to Wrigley (1997, p. 206), for example, the expectation of
life at birth among the English aristocracy lagged behind that of the population as whole until the
eighteenth century; among other reasons, because the children of aristocrats were weaned earlier
that the children of commoners. Hollingsworth (1957), reports that during the 14th and 15th
centuries, 46% of the sons of English dukes died violent deaths. The local peasants, on the other
hand, were free from the hazards of continual combat (although they were occasionally prey to
marauding lords). In line with this evidence, we shall assume that w < p:
2.1.4 Population dynamics
There is no migration and no mobility between social classes. Population dynamics is therefore
governed by the following laws of motion:
Nnextw = nwwNw| {z }
Children of
;
surviving warriors
Nnextp = nppNp| {z };
Children of
surviving peasants
where Nnextw and N
next
p are the sizes of the warrior class and of the peasantry during the next gener-
ation. Survival probabilities p and w are exogenously determined parameters. These assumptions
imply that any endogenous changes in population growth must come about through variations in
the birth rates nw and np.
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2.2 Equilibria
Assume Home and Foreign are identical: Nw = Nfw, Np = N
f
p , and Y = Y
f. The existence of a
rough equilibrium among competing societies can be traced back to the early stages of the adoption
of agriculture. OConnell (2002, p. 32) gives an example from the Sumerian world, which a man of
that times characterized as follows: You go and carry o¤ the enemys land; the enemy comes and
carries o¤ your land.
Our model has three symmetric equilibria, an unstratied equilibrium whereNw = 0 andNp > 0,
a stratied equilibrium where Nw > 0 and Np > 0, and a trivial equilibrium where Np = Nw = 0.
We will discuss in detail both non-trivial equilibria. The unstratied equilibrium will serve as a
benchmark to which the implications of the stratied equilibrium can be compared.
2.2.1 Unstratied equilibrium
In equilibrium, warrior and peasant populations remain constant through time:
Nw = wn

wN

w;
Np = pn

pN

p ;
where the asterisks indicate the equilibrium value of a variable. The rst of these conditions is
immediately satised in an unstratied society, where Nw = 0. The second condition implies that
pn

p = 1;
or equivalently,
np =
1
p
:
The average peasant must have, in expected terms, exactly one child. Since a fraction 1   p
of peasants does not survive to reproduce, the remaining peasants must compensate by having
more than one child: np > 1. Plugging this equilibrium value of np into the solutions of the adult
problem given in equations (6), (7), and (8) we get the equilibrium levels of income, consumption,
and utility:
yp =
p
(1  )p ; (9)
cp =
p
(1  )p ;
up =
p

p
1   :
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The equilibrium value of yp is our models equivalent to subsistence income. No matter how
much the production technology improves (i.e., how much A increases), the income of peasants
will always return to yp. Equilibrium income y

p ts nicely into Malthus and Ricardos view of
subsistence income: instead of being a biological minimum, equilibrium income is determined in
our model by preferences and prices.
In the long-run, population adjusts to keep income at a subsistence level. Combining equations
(3), (4), and (9) we get the equilibrium level of population:
N = Np =

(1  )AL
p
 1

: (10)
Observe that population is the only variable a¤ected in the long-run by total factor productiv-
ity, represented by parameter A. Technological improvements translate into nothing but larger
populations:
@ lnN
@ lnA
=
1

> 0:
Initially, a higher value of A allows more food to be produced by a given amount of labor.
Peasants consume part of that extra food and use the rest to have more children. As a result,
population begins to grow. But diminishing returns to labor imply population growth will eventually
o¤set the productivity enhancement. In the end, more peasants will be employed on the land and
the average amount of food produced by each of them will return to its original level. Consumption
will also fall back to where it started, as the price of children remains unaltered through the whole
process. This is the typical Malthusian result when there are diminishing returns to labor in
production.
The e¤ects of an increase in the price of children, represented by p, are more interesting. Both
long-run consumption and utility increase when children become more expensive:
@ ln cp
@ lnp
= 1 > 0;
@ lnup
@ lnp
=  > 0:
This results, which may seem paradoxical at rst, can be explained as follows. An increase in p
leads initially to decreased fertility and in the long-run to a reduction in population, so that fewer
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adults are employed on the land and hence labor productivity (yp) is higher:
@ lnNp
@ lnp
=
1

> 0;
@ ln yp
@ lnp
= 1 > 0:
When p rst increases, adults are no longer able to a¤ord their current mix of children and con-
sumption, and hence they experience a reduction in their utility. But when the system reaches the
new equilibrium, adults end up with more income but the same number of children as they had
before the shock. This implies that food consumption, and therefore utility, must be higher. The
existence of diminishing returns entails that the short-run and long-run impacts of an increase in
the price of children must run in opposite directions. Figure 1 illustrates the process. Under the
plausible assumption that children are normal goods (Tzannatos and Symons, 1989), this compar-
ative statics does not depend on the particular production and utility functions we use throughout
this paper. We provide a general proof in Appendix A.2.
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Children
E1
Food
E3
E2
3c1c2c
1 3 1 /n n s= =
2n
2u
1u
3u
BC3
BC1
BC2
*
1y
k*1 2/y
k*1 1/y
*
3y
Figure 1: An increase in the cost of children reduces welfare in the short-run but increases it in
the long-run. Point E1 represents the initial equilibrium. The income of a surviving adult, given
by y1 , is just enough to induce him to have 1= children at their current price 1. That level of
fertility ensures population will remain constant. All of a sudden the price of children raises from
1 to 2. Population and thus incomes are xed in the short-run, so the adults budget constrain
rotates inwards from BC1 to BC2. As a result, the adult moves to point E2, where his consumption,
his fertility, and his utility are all lower than before. The reduction in fertility causes population
to decline through the generations. Eventually, the decline in population will increase the returns
to labour up to y3 , pushing outwards the budget constrain from BC2 to BC3. Equilibrium is
reestablished at point E3, where income is just enough to induce the descendents of the original
adult to have 1= children given their new price 2. In the new equilibrium, fertility is the same
but consumption is higher than it was in the beginning. Consequently, utility is also higher.
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2.2.2 Stratied equilibrium
Both Nw and Np are positive in a stratied state. In the short run, the values of Nw and Np
are xed. Using the symmetry between Home and Foreign, together with equations (1) to (8), we
obtain the short-run equilibrium:
yw =
AN1 p
wNw
; yp =
(1  )N1 p
pNp
;
cw =
AN1 p
wNw
; cp =
 (1  )N1 p
pNp
;
nw =
(1  )AN1 p
wNww
; np =
(1  ) (1  )N1 p
pNpp
;
uw =
wA
N1 p
1 w Nw
; up =
p (1  )AN1 p
1 p Np
:
(Short-run equilibrium)
In the long-run, surviving warriors and surviving peasants must bear just enough children to
keep their numbers constant:
Nw = n

wwN

w;
Np = n

ppN

p :
The above conditions imply that the typical warrior and the typical peasant must have, in expected
terms, the same number of children:
nww = n

pp: (11)
If peasants were to breed faster than warriors, the ratio of warriors to peasants would contract until
warriors became extinct and all the population was composed by peasants. Conversely, if warriors
were to breed faster than peasants, the ratio of warriors to peasants would expand until peasants
were no longer able to support the warrior class. Eventually, the warrior class would collapse under
its own weight. Hence, condition (11) is necessary for a stratied equilibrium to obtain.
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Substituting the short-run equilibrium values of nw and np into condition (11) we obtain the
long-run equilibrium level of population and the class composition in Home:
N = 

(1  ) (1  )A
p
 1

"
1 +

1  

w
p
 1#
; (12)
Nw
Np
=

1  

w
p
 1
: (13)
Following Andreski (1968, p. 33), we will refer to Nw=Np as Homes military participation ratio, or
MPR.
Finally, plugging N and Nw=N

p into the short-run equilibrium values of income, consumption,
fertility, and utility we get the long-run equilibrium values of these variables:
yw =
w
(1  )w ; y

p =
p
(1  )p ;
cw =
w
(1  )w ; c

p =
p
(1  )p ;
nw =
1
w
; np =
1
p
;
uw =
w

w
1   ; u

p =
p

p
1   :
(Long-run equilibrium)
The e¤ect of social stratication on economic privilege
The average warrior or peasant must support exactly one child. These averages include people who
have no children because they die prematurely and survivors with more than one child. Because
warrior children are more expensive than peasant children, equilibrium requires that the average
warrior has a higher income than the average peasant. Let yw be the per capita income of warriors
and yp be the per capita income of peasants. In equilibrium we have
yw = wy

w =
w
1   >
p
1   = py

p = y

p;
since w > p. Note that income inequality is entirely determined by the additional costs warriors
must incur in training and equipping their children.
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As a result of yw > y

p, warriors will have higher per capita consumption than peasants:
cw = wc

w =
w
1   >
p
1   = pc

p = c

p;
The economic inequality between surviving warriors and surviving peasants is more pronounced
than the economic inequality between pre-war warriors and pre-war peasants:
yw
yp
=
w=w
p=p
>
w
p
=
yw
yp
cw
cp
=
w=w
p=p
>
w
p
=
cw
cp
:
This is due to the fact that a surviving warrior must nance  1w children whereas a surviving
peasant must nance  1p (< 
 1
w ) children.
The warriorsdegree of privilege in terms of utility is given by:
uw
up
=

w
p

| {z }
<1


w
p

| {z }
>1
? 1:
As warriors face a larger risk of death than peasants (w < p), the warriors degree of privilege could
be lower than 1, meaning that the peasantry would be the privileged class. This is a possible though
unlikely state of a¤airs, as warrior children would probably shun the military career. Some form of
compulsion or indoctrination would thus be required to keep the warrior class from disbanding.
If, on the contrary, warriors enjoy more utility than peasants, coercion may be needed to enforce
property rights or, in extremis, a peasant revolution. This is probably why the vast majority of
warrior nobilities kept their peasants disarmed. Before the westernization of Japan, for example,
the bearing of arms was a strict prerogative of the nobles (with the very brief exception of the
Taikwa reforms period, during the 7th century). It was no coincidence that no peasant rebellion
ever succeeded in Japan (Andreski, 1958, p. 50). Some authors suggest other mechanisms that would
allow a privileged upper class to subsist without coercing the lower classes. For example, if groups
are segregated and investments in human capital generate within-groups positive externalities, then
individual choices may lead to self-perpetuating economic di¤erences between groups (Lundberg and
Startz, 1998); or upper-class propaganda could deceive the lower classes into believing economic
inequalities are in their best interest (Cronk, 1994; DeMarrais et al., 1996); or if people tend be
inuenced by members of their own social classes, lower-class people could just learn to play, without
further questioning, their disadvantaged role in society (Henrich and Boyd, 2007).
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Stratication reduces total population and maximizes military power
Maximal peasant population cannot be an equilibrium for a stratied state. When peasant pop-
ulation is at its maximum, the peasantry does not produce the surplus of food that is needed to
support a warrior class. To produce a surplus, a stratied state must employ fewer peasants on the
land, and therefore produce less food than would be possible with the existing technology. This
can be observed in Figure 2, by comparing points E and H.
Everything else being equal, total population will be lower in a stratied state than in an
unstratied state, for two reasons. First, stratied states produce less food than unstratied states,
and less food means fewer people can be fed. Second, the per capita income of warriors is higher
than the per capita income of peasants, so even the same amount of food would support fewer
people in a stratied state. Figure 2 illustrates this point. In algebraic terms: from equations (10)
and (12) it follows that population will be lower with than without stratication if and only if
[(1  )w + p] (1  )
1 

w
< 1;
which is always true since  2 (0; 1) and p < w.
Would peasants be better o¤ without social stratication? The answer is: only temporarily,
as can be inferred from Figure 2. Imagine that peasants organized a revolution and proceeded
to execute all warriors. The per capita income of peasants would immediately rise from yp to
Y (Np )=N

p , with the consequent increase of welfare. But the higher per capita income will sooner
or later translate into higher fertility rates, and population will begin to grow. Consequently, the
per capita income will fall until it reaches the subsistence level, at which point population growth
will come to a halt (point H in the gure). After a period of increased welfare, peasants will
end up as poor as before. In the new, unstratied equilibrium the state produces no surplus,
and population is maximal. Were population any larger, the average product of labor would be
forced below subsistence, and the population would decline until equilibrium was restored. This is
conrmed by observing that the equilibrium value of up is equal to (1  ) 1 pp both with and
without stratication.
Sauvy (195254/1969, pp. 5159) argues that maximizing military power requires maximizing
the surplus that is available to support an army. This is clearly the case in our model, as the assump-
tion that peasants get their marginal product entails that surplus, and hence warrior population,
will be maximized in equilibrium (see proof in Appendix A.1).
Finally, note that all results above hold in our model irrespective of the existence of war, because
war does not a¤ect Homes equilibrium income:
Homes income = Y + Y f   fY| {z }
Net spoils of war
= YHome ;
19
since Y = Y f and  = f.
Technological progress in food production will only increase population
Just as in the unstratied equilibrium, a technological improvement in food production has no e¤ect
but to increase total population:
@ lnN
@ lnA
=
1

> 0:
This result explains why the shift form hunting-and-gathering to agriculture (8,000 to 3,000 BC)
was accompanied by the rst demographic explosion ever to be recorded (Bocquet-Appel, 2002).
The yield of the land steadily increased as a result of a series of technological improvements that
can be read as increases in parameter A: fertilizers, fallowing, irrigation systems, the plow, and crop
rotation (Vasey, 1992, pp. 4457, 111). Suddenly, food was available to our ancestors in quantities
they never dreamt before (Price and Gebauer, 1995). Just a few centuries after adopting agriculture,
typical communities saw its numbers grow from about 30 people to 300 or more. Population densities
also increased in those places where agriculture was adopted: from less than one hunter-gatherer
per square mile, to 20 or more farmers on the same area (Johnson and Earle, 2000, pp. 43, 125,
246).
The present model also explains why the adoption of agriculture was not accompanied by im-
provements in our ancestorsnutrition, as studies of the human fossil record have revealed (Arme-
lagos et al., 1991; Cohen, 1989):
@ ln c
@ lnA
= 0:
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Figure 2: Stratication reduces total population and maximizes military power. Point H corresponds
to the unstratied equilibrium (i.e., N 00w = 0, so N
00 = N 00p ). At point H, the average product of
peasants equals their per capita income [i.e., Y (N 00p )=N
00
p = y

p], and per capita income is xed at the
subsistence level yp by the long-run equilibrium conditions. The state produces no surplus. Points
E and F correspond to the stratied equilibrium. At point E, the marginal product of peasants is
equal to their per capita income, so the surplus S = Y (Np ) Np yp is maximal. Also, total food
production is lower with stratication than without it [i.e., Y (Np ) < Y (N
00
p )]. Point G indicates
what total population would be if warriors had the same per capita income as peasants (i.e., yp).
If this were the case, the number of warriors would be equal to N 0w = S
=yp and total population
would be N 0 = N 0w +N

p : In the long-run equilibrium, however, the per capita income of warriors
is equal to yw. Hence the equilibrium number of warriors is N

w = S
=yw and total population is
N = Nw +N

p : Since y

w > y

p, it follows that N

w < N
0
w and hence N
 < N 0: Thus, stratication
reduces total population for two reasons: total food production is lower, and the per capita income
of warriors is higher than the per capita income of peasants.
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More expensive weapons imply a lower MPR and higher income inequality
An increase in the costs of weapons and military training is represented in our model by an increase
in the ratio w=p. Our model predicts that an increase in w=p will reduce the MPR, reduce
total population, and sharpen income inequality in favor of warriors:
@ ln
 
Nw=N

p

@ ln (w=p)
=  1 < 0:
@ ln (N)
@ ln (w)
=
 p
(1  )w + p < 0:
@ ln(yw=y

p)
@ ln (w=p)
= 1 > 0:
Andreski (1962, pp. 4041) observes that and increase in the cost of weapons tends to reduce
the MPR and to increase the economic advantage of warriors, exactly as our model predicts. He
provides historical examples from a wide array of civilizations (pp. 3972). We reproduce here three
of Andreskis examples, to give the reader a taste of the historical evidence.
Persia In times of the Achaemenid empire the Persian army consisted of nobles and freemen.
The MPR was high since the freemen were very numerous, maybe even more than the peasants.
Most of the army battled on foot, supported by a minimal cavalry. The main weapons in use were
the bow and the long spear. Protective armors were scanty and uncommon. When the Sassanid
dynasty rose to power in the third century A.D., it introduced a series of e¤ective but very expensive
military innovations; most importantly the stirrup and heavy protective armors. As a result, the
freemen disappeared, the warrior nobility shrunk while its privileges expanded, and the peasants
were reduced to harsh servitude (pp. 4647).
Poland The original Polish kingdom was despotic. Freemen and the kings personal guard,
the Druzhina, conformed the army. Both groups were armed with primitive weapons and did not
wear body armors. Gradually, the army incorporated more advanced equipment. Heavily armed
horsemen were the mainstay of the Polish forces that repelled the Teutonic Knights in Grünewald
(1410 A.D.). The modernization of the army was accompanied by a reduction of the MPR and an
increase in social inequalities: peasants were reduced to the status of serfs, and military service was
restricted to the nobility (pp. 5960).
England The Norman conquest of England, which introduced heavy cavalry to the country,
sharpened social inequalities relative to the preceding Anglo-Saxon period. This process began to
be reversed during the wars against the Welshmen, when English warriors learned how to use the
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long bow. An inexpensive yet formidable weapon, the long bow was far superior to any other type
of bow. In combination with cavalry, it was able to inict enormous damage on enemy forces.
The adoption of the long bow forced profound changes in military tactics and organization. As
a consequence of these changes, serfdom virtually disappeared from England, yeomen thrived, the
MPR increased, and social inequality became much less pronounced (pp. 6465).
As o¤ensive weapons become more e¤ective, states become more populous
A relative improvement of o¤ensive weapons has only one e¤ect: increasing population.
@ lnN
@ ln
=  > 0:
Historical evidence, as presented by Andreski (1968, p. 76), is consistent with this implication of
our model. Andreski observes that when the art of fortications surpasses the existing siege-craft,
the number of independent states within a given area tends to increase, and the population of
these states to decrease. Andreski provides examples from several cultures. Here we mention just a
few. The Assyrians, who were the rst to develop e¤ective siege-engines (e.g., battering rams) and
created the rst cavalry, built an empire much bigger than any other seen hitherto. The creation of
the Chinese empire was also related to the appearance of siege-engines. Before that, the strongholds
that protected the dominions of Chinese feudal lords were almost impregnable. Philip of Macedon
introduced catapults and balistas into the Balkan Peninsula, and with their aid he wielded the thus
far independent greek cities into one empire (pp. 7678).
The MPR and the warriorsdegree of economic privilege are negatively correlated
The main stylized fact detected by Andreski (1968) is a negative correlation between the MPR and
the warriorsdegree of economic privilege (pp. 40, 73). This fact is consistent with the predictions
of our model, as shown in Table 1. It is never the case in our model that an increase in the MPR
accompanies an increase in the privileges of warriors. Moreover, when the relative price of warrior
children increases, MPR goes down while privileges go up.
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Table 1
Response of the military participation ratio (Nw=N

p ), income inequality
(yw=y

p), and population (N
) to changes in the parameters of the model
Parameter Nw=N

p y

w=y

p N

Price of warrior children relative
to peasant children (w=p)
  + 0
E¤ectiveness of o¤ensive relative
to defensive weapons ()
0 0 +
Total factor productivity in
agriculture (A)
0 0 +
3 Concluding remarks
Population dynamics plays a central role in our model. In its present form, the model assumes that
the numbers of warriors and peasants are regulated exclusively through endogenous variations in
fertility. Mortality rates are exogenous, and there is no migration across the frontiers of the state or
mobility between classes. The model could be modied to allow for endogenous mortality by making
death rates a function of per capita income. Provided the endogenous fertility mechanism continued
to operate, the inclusion of endogenous mortality would not a¤ect the basic results. Allowing for
migration or social mobility would be more problematic. The e¤ect of such movements would
depend on how they were modelled and on the scale of the human ows. If migration and mobility
were on a small scale, their inclusion in the model would not signicantly a¤ect the results. However,
very large scale migration or inter-class mobility might radically alter the conclusions. Both the
e¤ects of migration and of inter-class mobility deserve further exploration.
Greater realism could also be achieved by dropping the unisex assumption and distinguishing
between men and women. Polygyny and the division of labor between the sexes could then be
incorporated into the model. The class structure could be made more realistic as well, by including
servants and craftsmen that provide goods and services to the rest of the population. Admin-
istrators, technicians, scientists, and priests could also be included in the model. Most of these
modications would not a¤ect the basic results. The one area where there might be a signicant
e¤ect is agricultural technology and the variables that depend on it. In our model, stratication
results in less food production and a smaller total population. This might not be true if the model
were to include administrators, technicians, and scientists. Although not directly employed in agri-
culture, such people might contribute indirectly to food production by organizing public works
and promoting the use of more productive technologies, thereby raising total food production and
allowing the economy to support a larger population. Our conclusion that stratication reduces
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population assumes that the indirect contribution of the upper classes to agricultural production is
of limited importance.
Another area worth exploring is that of peasant incomes. Our model assumes that in the
stratied society peasants receive their marginal product. Two alternative justications were given
for this assumption: (1) there is competition in the labor market; (2) there is a crop-sharing rule
that in the long-run maximizes the surplus available to nance the army. The second justication
presumes that competition between states will favor the evolution of social practices that maximize
military power. This group selection argument deserves examination in its own right.
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A Appendix
A.1 A crop-sharing rule that maximizes military power
Suppose that warriors take a share  of total food production Y . This leaves (1 )Y to be divided
among pNp surviving peasants. The income of typical peasant is therefore
yp =
(1  )Y
pNp
:
From the solution to the adults problem we know the fertility of each peasant is given by
np =
(1  )yp
p
:
Also recall that total production is Y = AN1 p . Hence,
pnp =
(1  )(1  )AN p
p
:
Long-run equilibrium requires nppN

p = N

p . From this condition and the above equations it
follows that
Np =
 
(1  )(1  )A
p
! 1

:
Rearranging terms we get the amount of food taken by the warrior class:
Surplus = Y = (1  ) 1  A 1

1  
p
 1 

:
The right-hand side of the above equation is maximized by taking  = . Since Nw is proportional
to the available surplus, Nw will also be maximal.
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A.2 Malthusian equilibrium with a general utility function
Assume the utility of a typical adult is given by function u(c; n), were c  0 is the adults consumption
and n  0 the number of his children. Function u is strictly increasing in both its arguments, and
also quasiconcave. The adult maximizes his utility choosing c and n, subject to the budget constrain
c+ n  y. Parameter   0 represents the price of children, and y  0 is the adults income. The
maximization yields the following rst order condition:
un
uc
= ; (14)
where subscripts denote partial di¤erentiation.
The model in the text assumes that fertility must in the long-run converge to a certain level
n (= 1=) that keeps population constant. This demographic equilibrium is achieved through the
interplay of two forces: demographic pressures and diminishing returns to labor. These two forces
will carry y to a value that induces adults to choose n = n, given price . That means the long-run
value of c is fully determined by the following expression:
un(c; n)
uc(c; n)
= ;
What happens if the price of children increases? Di¤erentiating the above expression with
respect to c and rearranging yields
@c
@
=

@
@c

un(c; n)
uc(c; n)
 1
:
Hence, long-run consumption will be an increasing function of  if and only if
@
@c

un(c; n)
uc(c; n)

> 0: (15)
Condition (15) can be interpreted in terms of indi¤erence curves, as shown in gure 1. The condition
states that the slope of the indi¤erence curve must be atter at E3 than at E1. Observe that if
condition (15) holds, long-run utility will also rise when  increases, simply because uc > 0.
A bit of algebra proves that condition (15) will hold if children are normal goods. First we use
rst order condition (14) to reformulate condition (15) as follows:
@
@c

un
uc

=
ucn
uc
  unucc
u2c
=
unc   ucc
uc
> 0:
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Since uc > 0, the above inequality boils down to
unc   ucc > 0:
On the other hand, the e¤ect of income on the adults demand for children is given by
dn
dy
=
ucn   ucc
 2ucc + 2ucn   unn : (16)
Since u is quasi-concave and  = un=uc, the denominator of the right hand side of equation (16)
must be positive. Therefore, children will be normal if ucn   ucc > 0, a condition that subsumes
condition (15).
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